y family came from Ballarat, but they didn’t retell any stories from there about the ’39 fires.

I grew up at Mount Clear, in a bush suburb outside Ballarat. I have been through fires and seen fires, the fires at Maryborough, Tarnagulla. I can remember driving through those and seeing fence posts on fire and being turned away. It is a pretty horrific experience.

Obviously ‘39 was the most significant fire in Victoria’s history and regrettably the most number of deaths. It was the most significant destruction of the natural and man-made landscape, and probably the worst climatic conditions that Victoria has experienced, which set off the fire episode around the state.

My knowledge is largely from reading the Royal Commission, reading about the ’39 fires. Learning the lessons of ’39 for the sort of work we’re doing now in trying to make sure we’ve got a proper response to fire around Victoria.

I think the key aftermath from 1939 was that there wasn’t an active enough system to deal with fire-fighting on public and private land. One of the key recommendations that has endured effectively up until today has been the establishment of the Forestry Commission to deal with fires on public land, and the establishment of a volunteer fire service, the now Country Fire Authority, which was largely for fighting fire on private land. That was the profound outcome of the ’39 fires in terms of action.

The other thing the Royal Commission made quite clear was what caused the fire. Of course it was the worst possible conditions for a fire, years of drought before it, but the fire was, as Judge Stretton put it, lit by the hand of man. People camping, people throwing cigarettes or matches outside windows, or – predominantly – settlers and farmers, who were burning off in the wrong conditions in order to get new pasture.

The very debate we are having now should be informed by ’39, because ’39 identified the problems that occurred from people taking into their own hands when they could or couldn’t light fires, when they could or couldn’t do control burns. That should be a regulated system. It was a fundamental finding in the Royal Commission, and the issues now are the very issues that were dealt with then.

We certainly have learned from ’39. It has been, and probably will be the most important lesson we will ever learn in Victoria. We’ve established institutionally responses which are as good as anywhere in the world, probably the best in the world, through the success of the Forestry Commission, now the Department of Sustainability and Environment, and the CFA.

So I think we have learned a lot. We’ve learned much more about managing fires as well as putting them out, shaping them, protecting the people fighting fires, protecting people in danger of losing their lives from fires and protecting property as well. We've learned the hierarchy of needs much better from ’39 as well. And I think the Royal Commission was an excellent report. It’s certainly helped shape the sort of systems we have now in Victoria.

In 2003, we had probably the closest we’ve ever had to the conditions of ’39. We had a continual dry period for five years before, and we had temperatures approaching 40 degrees. We had strong northerly winds, and that was occurring regularly. It wasn’t as bad in terms of climatic conditions, but it was very close, and I think we were much better prepared.

We can’t ever think that somehow we can solve the problem of fires in Victoria. We can’t. There are going to be fires. The topography means there are going to be fires in the future, the climate means that as well. But what we can do is respond to it better, protect lives in a better way and protect property in a better way. That’s certainly what we have with new technology, new efforts in fighting fire and fire suppression.

If you look at ’39 and you look at this one, the geography was very similar. It was stunning that we didn’t have anyone in 2003 who lost their lives fighting the fires and we didn’t have anyone who lost their life from the fire either. Regrettably later, a departmental worker lost her life, ironically in a flood, which is dreadful.

But we have learned a lot and we have learned to do it better. We have better technology. They had no air capacity, now we have air capacity. We have much better coordination on the ground. We have much better laws, saying when people can light fires.

It’s very difficult unless you’ve experienced such a tragedy to identify with the psychological trauma and damage that is done by such a natural disaster, and also, the feeling of guilt. Could I have done more, did I do the right thing?

The best indication has been the ’39 Royal Commission report, which showed there was nothing that could be done at that point in time. With the existing laws, we could have prevented those fires occurring. They were the strongest fires Victoria has ever had, but the systems weren’t in place properly and appropriately to deal with them.

It’s no fault of individuals. They faced horrific odds in trying to fight those fires and save lives, save friends and family members. There would be a lot of hurt there. I can’t imagine what it is like. All we can say is that it is no fault of theirs. We have learned by the examination of these fires to do it a lot better, and that is an important lesson I think they can take heart from.

They fought with so little equipment. Now we have air cover and the best possible technology to fight fires, and the best possible meteorological advice. The equipment we have now is just incredible. To think that they fought fires without that - it’s hero status, and it is something we can all be grateful for.

In ’39 there wasn’t an effective system in place to protect the lives of fire-fighters, people in the path of fires and their property. Today, we have systems to shape the fire, and move it away from settled areas. Fire-fighters are now trained to know when to retreat or leave, and they have the right back-up and support. None of those systems where in place then, and I think it was pretty much ‘every man for himself’.

That is something we will never, ever do again - to not have a system in place and not have proper preparation.